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1 Introduction 
 
What is the relationship between philosophical and scientific theories of perception? We should not 
expect there to be a straightforward answer to this question, not least because of the multitude of 
subdisciplines and methodologies involved. The philosophy of perception, for example, includes 
research on the epistemic role of perceptual states, the subjective qualities of perceptual experience, 
and the metaphysical relation between perceivers and the world. Research in the science of 
perception involves computational models of perceptual algorithms, neurobiological models of 
perceptual systems, and behavioural models of the relation between perception, attention, and 
action. In this paper, I will be narrowing my focus to the relationship between two particular debates 
about perception: the debate between naïve realists, intentionalists, and others, which I will refer to 
as the ‘Metaphysical debate’, and the debate between ecological theorists and constructivist theorists, 
which I will refer to as the ‘Psychological debate’.1 
 
My interest in the relationship between the philosophy and science of perception comes largely from 
thinking about recent work in naturalistic metaphysics, which explores the role of scientific theories 
and data in our metaphysical theorizing.2 Although I hope this paper paves the way for further work 
in the naturalistic metaphysics of perception, I will not be making any particularly naturalistic 
assumptions or arguments here. I am proposing that, regardless of how you characterize the 
relationship between metaphysics and science, Metaphysical and Psychological theories of 
 
1 Throughout this paper, I will use the term ‘Metaphysical’ to describe both the particular debate and the 
individual theories it involves: intentionalism, naïve realism, sense datum theory, and adverbialism. I will use 
the term ‘Psychological’ to describe both the particular debate between ecological and constructivist theories, 
and the theories themselves. As will become apparent, I want to leave open the possibility that the 
Psychological debate is as metaphysical as the Metaphysical debate.   
2 The commitments of naturalistic metaphysicians vary widely: for a representative sample see Hawley (2006), 
Ladyman and Ross (2007), French and Mackenzie (2012), Paul (2012), Chakrabartty (2017). 
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perception present a particularly interesting case study. Philosophers debating naïve realism and 
intentionalism take themselves to be engaged in a debate which is distinct from and orthogonal to 
the psychological debate between ecological and constructivist theories of perception. McDowell 
(2010), for example, clearly distances the philosophical study of perceivers from the scientific study 
of their perceptual systems. Even philosophers who acknowledge a relationship between 
Metaphysical and Psychological theories, such as Lowe (2000), assume that the debate between naïve 
realism and intentionalism does not stand or fall with the debate between ecological and 
constructivist theories. When we try to specify the grounds for distinguishing between the two 
debates, however, we face a challenge: the usual strategies for distinguishing between metaphysical 
and scientific theories (e.g. appealing to differences in their modal strength, their methodology or 
their explanatory features) don’t seem to apply. I will argue that any differences we find between the 
two approaches do not license the conclusion that the two debates are orthogonal.  
 
I will suggest that the two debates are engaged in the same general project concerning the nature of 
perception, and that the Psychological theories are no less metaphysical than the Metaphysical 
theories. I am not arguing that the Psychological theories are superior to the Metaphysical theories, 
but merely that the Psychological theories should be recognized as part of the debate about the 
metaphysical nature of perception.   
 
In the next part of the paper, I will introduce the two debates under consideration: the Metaphysical 
debate between theories such naïve realism and intentionalism, and the Psychological debate 
between ecological and constructivist theories. I will then consider the standard strategies for 
distinguishing between different kinds of theories in virtue of their commitments or methodologies. 
One might attempt to distinguish between the modal strength of different theoretical claims (e.g. 
necessary versus contingent truths), different methodological approaches (e.g. conceptual analysis 
versus inference to the best explanation), or different explanatory strategies (e.g. constitutive versus 
causal explanation). I will argue that none of these strategies work: both the Metaphysical and 
Psychological debates rely on inference to the best explanation to draw contingent conclusions 
about the constitutive nature of perceptual experience. Finally, I will consider and reject the 
suggestion that the relevant distinction is between personal and subpersonal explanations. Even if 
this characterizes some of the differences between Metaphysical and Psychological debates, I will 
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argue that it does not establish that the two debates are orthogonal, and it leaves open that 
Psychological theories are addressing the same metaphysical questions as Metaphysical theories.  
 
2 Two approaches to theorizing about perception 
 
2.1 Metaphysical theories of perception 
A key project in the metaphysics of perception is the attempt to specify the nature of perception. 
With further qualifications to come, the main positions in the familiar Metaphysical debate can be 
summarized as follows: 
Naïve realism. Perception is a non-representational relation to mind-independent objects. 
Intentionalism. Perception is a matter of representing mind-independent objects in certain 
ways. 
Sense-Datum Theory. Perception is a relation to a mental object. 
Adverbialism. Perception is an adverbially modified non-relational mental state.  
Each of these positions has been put forward as a Metaphysical claim about the nature of 
perception, but they can also be used specifically to account for the phenomenal character of 
perceptual experience.3 I will focus in this paper on the metaphysical positions themselves rather 
than their accounts of phenomenal character. I will be using the terms ‘perception’ and ‘perceptual 
experience’ interchangeably.  
 
The Metaphysical debate about perception is usually taken to include the four positions outlined 
above. In what follows I will be restricting my attention to naïve realism and intentionalism, which I 
take to be the two most popular contemporary theories. I will assume that naïve realism and 
intentionalism are both ‘direct’ theories in the sense that they both allow that we have veridical 
perceptual experience of the mind-independent world, and they both deny that we do so in virtue of 
 
3 These different roles are captured by French and Crane’s (2017) distinction between two levels at which a 
perceptual theory can operate, according to which Level 1 theories tell us about the nature or structure of 
experience, and Level 2 theories tell us how Level 1 theories account for phenomenal character. See also 
Fish’s (2009) distinction between the ontological and phenomenal formulations of naïve realism.  
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first perceiving some mental object or sense-datum. The main difference between the two theories is 
in how they understand the perceiver’s connection to the mind-independent world: naïve realists 
claim that our relation to the worldly objects of our perceptual experience is not mediated by 
representation, whereas intentionalists claim that we perceive the world by representing it (accurately 
or otherwise) as being a particular way.4  
  
 
2.2 Psychological theories of perception 
The science of perceptual psychology, and vision in particular, has been dominated over the past 
fifty years by a debate between two theoretical approaches: constructivist and ecological.5 It is widely 
known that the data on our retina are compatible with an infinite number of distinct percepts: one 
pattern of retinal data could be caused by two objects of different sizes at the same distance from us, 
for example, or by two objects of the same size at different distances from us. (In vision science, this 
is also known as the ‘inverse problem’ of optics.) In each case, however, we experience just one 
determinate scenario, rather than a set of underdetermined possibilities. Constructivist and 
ecological theories propose very different ways to account for this.  
 
Proponents of constructivist theories acknowledge that our retinal data underdetermine our 
perceptual experience. They propose that our minds supplement the sparse retinal information with 
additional stored information, allowing us to reconstruct which of the many compatible scenes is 
actually causing our experience. The earliest constructivist theory of visual perception was put 
forward by Helmholtz (1878), who argued that when we perceive, we draw ‘unconscious inferences’ 
from the retinal data to their source: our perceptual experiences are the conclusions of these 
inferences. Any notion of inference requires positing representations, in the sense of semantically-
 
4 There are naïve realists who argue that intentionalism should be considered ‘indirect’ in the sense that is not 
essentially world-involving, because we can be in the same type of representational perceptual state whether 
the relevant worldly object is present or not. Further discussion of the matter can be found in McDowell 
(1998), Fish (2004), and Drayson (2018). (Some of the claims I make in the current paper diverge from those 
in the 2018 paper.) 
5 In what follows I will frame the difference between constructivist and ecological approaches in terms of 
visual perception, but the two positions apply to perception in general and can be applied to all its modalities. 
Constructivist and ecological approaches tell very different stories about haptic touch, for example.  
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evaluable states which function as the premises and conclusions of the inferences.6  Constructivist 
theories take many different forms: computational models which recreate the causes of sensory 
input bottom-up look very different from top-down computational models which use stored priors 
to predict the probability of sensory inputs, and Helmholtz’s own model predated computational 
approaches to the mind. What they all share is the basic constructivist commitment that we perceive 
the world by drawing inferences from our sensory input.  
 
Constructivist theories can be contrasted with ecological theories of perception. Proponents of 
ecological theories deny that perception faces an underdetermination problem, because they do not 
take our sensory input to be restricted to static data on individual sense organs (e.g. the retina). They 
broaden the notion of sensory input to include dynamic information, such as the way that the 
ambient light array changes as we move. Ecological theories of perceptual psychology were first 
proposed by Gibson (1967, 1979), who argued that dynamic information from the light array can 
account for our determinate perceptual experience in a way that static retinal data cannot, and 
without any need for inference. Gibson proposed that when a perceiver actively explores their 
environment, some aspects of the light array will change while others will remain invariant. These 
invariances supposedly provide information about the world which the perceiver can detect without 
any need for inference. Ecological theories take a non-representational approach to perception: 
without the need for inference, there is no need to posit the sorts of representations over which 
inference would take place.  
 
There is, of course, much more to the psychology of perception than what I am calling the 
Psychological debate. My interest here is in the debate between constructivist and ecological theories 
in general, rather than in different versions of them, or in the psychology of perception more 
generally.  
 
 
6 Constructivist theories differ as to whether they understand the representations as propositional contents, 
formal symbols, or imagistic models. 
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2.3 Comparing the Metaphysical and Psychological debates 
There is a prima facie resemblance between the Metaphysical and Psychological debates about 
perception. It has been noted that the differences between constructivist and ecological theories 
“echo, to some extent, disagreements amongst contemporary philosophers of perception” (Lowe 
2000, 131) concerning naïve realism and intentionalism. Both the Metaphysical and Psychological 
debates concern whether or not our perceptual experience of the world is mediated by some form of 
representation. But proponents of Metaphysical theories like naïve realism and intentionalism 
generally take themselves to be engaged in a different debate from proponents of Psychological 
theories. In the rest of this paper, I will explore the various ways we might try to distinguish between 
the two debates.  
 
First, one might look at the modal strength of the theories: are Metaphysical theories of perception 
proposing necessary truths, for example, and are Psychological theories of perception proposing 
contingent truths (3.1)? Second, one might consider the methodology which produces the theories 
in question: are Metaphysical theories the result of a priori conceptual analysis, for example, while 
Psychological theories use empirical evidence to draw an inference to the best explanation (3.2)? I 
will argue that proponents of both Metaphysical and Psychological theories use inference to the best 
explanation to draw contingent conclusions about the nature of perception, and that neither strategy 
relies on empirical evidence. Third, I explore whether we can distinguish between two different 
approaches to inference to the best explanation: perhaps Metaphysical theories concern constitutive 
explanation while Psychological theories concern causal explanation (3.3)? I will argue that both 
Metaphysical and Psychological theories of perception should be understood as constitutive 
explanations of psychological capacities rather than causal explanations of psychological events. I 
then consider whether we might understand the two debates as concerned with different ‘levels’ of 
constitutive explanation, using the personal/subpersonal distinction (3.4). I think this is perhaps the 
most promising strategy for highlighting how some Metaphysical and Psychological theories differ, 
but I will argue that it fails to demonstrate that the two debates are in any sense orthogonal to each 
other. 
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3 Distinguishing the metaphysical and scientific debates 
 
3.1 Is there a difference in the modal strength of the theories? 
Philosophers have traditionally separated philosophical claims from scientific claims in terms of their 
modal status, arguing that science gives us facts about how the world actually is, while philosophy 
delivers truths about how the world could be or must be. Many philosophers understand metaphysical 
truths to be true of necessity: metaphysical truths are thus assumed to be truths that hold in all possible 
worlds.7 If we apply this framework to the case of perception, we might be tempted to assume that 
Metaphysical theories propose necessary truths about properties that perception has in all possible 
worlds, while Psychological theories merely offer us contingent truths about properties that 
perception has in the actual world.  
 
There are several reasons, however, to think that this modal framework will not help us to 
distinguish between Metaphysical and Psychological theories of perception. Most importantly, this is 
not an accurate depiction of metaphysical and scientific claims more generally: there are 
metaphysical truths which are not necessary, and there are scientific truths which are not contingent. 
Many metaphysicians acknowledge that a metaphysical model of the world “does not need to rely on 
claims involving necessity” (Paul 2012, 15), and allow that at least some metaphysical claims about 
the nature of the world are merely contingently true.8 Conversely, scientifically-discovered truths 
(such as the those concerning the molecular structure of water and the atomic number of gold) are 
often claimed to be necessary truths.  
 
Even if metaphysical and scientific claims more generally could be categorized respectively as 
necessary and contingent, this would not help us to understand the difference between Metaphysical 
and Psychological theories of perception. Notice that most Metaphysical theories of perception are 
not framed in terms of necessity. Very few naïve realists can be found explicitly committing to the 
 
7 Even contingentists acknowledge that it is a widely held belief that “metaphysical truths are not just truths 
about our world, but are truths about every world: they are metaphysically necessary” (Miller 2009, 23). 
8 Paul emphasizes that understanding the nature of the world is the sort of project that “may take its claims 
about the world to be contingently true in the actual world and worlds relevantly similar to our world” (Paul 
2012, 8). 
Final draft: please cite published version in Heather Logue and Louise Richardson (eds.),  
Purpose and Procedure in the Philosophy of Perception (OUP) 
 
 8 
claim that perception is necessarily an unmediated relation to worldly objects, and even fewer 
intentionalists explicitly claim that perception is necessarily a matter of representing the world a 
certain way. (There is a subset of naïve realists who do sometimes appear to be using transcendental 
arguments to make stronger modal claims. I will not address them in this paper, because their 
necessity claims do not concern the mind-independent world and thus cannot establish the version 
of naïve realism under consideration here,.9 ) A standard way to argue for a metaphysically necessary 
truth is to who show that its negation is metaphysically impossible, but we do not generally find 
proponents of Metaphysical theories of perception characterizing the negation of their view as 
impossible, inconceivable, or leading to contradiction.10 In the absence of explicit modal 
commitments, we might nevertheless have grounds for interpreting Metaphysical theories of 
perception as necessity claims on the basis of the arguments involved: strategies relying on 
conceptual analysis, two-dimensional semantics, the logic of counterfactual conditionals or the 
cognitive ability to detect metaphysically necessary truths, for example, are associated with the 
epistemology of modality. But the Metaphysical debate about perception rarely appeals to such 
strategies, either a priori or a posteriori.  
 
One might think that philosophers of perception ought to be making stronger modal claims about the 
nature of perception than they do in fact make. In this paper I take no stance on this matter: my aim 
here is to give an accurate characterization of how proponents of Metaphysical theories describe 
their own views. 
 
 
9 Some naïve realists use transcendental arguments to claim that certain features of our perceptual 
phenomenology necessitate that we are directly (non-representationally) related to worldly objects. But naïve 
realism is a position about the mind-independent objects of perception, and it is widely acknowledged that 
transcendental arguments cannot provide us with necessary truths about the mind-independent world rather 
than how we take the world to be (Stroud 1968). In a recent defence of transcendental naïve realism, Allen 
(2019) acknowledges this point and focuses on how a transcendental approach can reveal how naïve realism is 
possible, or how it is practically (rather than rationally) compelling. See also Allen (this volume) for discussion 
of different ways to interpret the naïve realist position.  
10 When Lowe argues against naïve realism, for example, he emphasizes that he is not trying to show that 
naïve realism is incoherent, absurd, inconsistent, or inherently impossible. He explicitly proposes his own 
alternative theory as a contingent matter of fact rather than a necessary truth (Lowe 1981). 
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To understand why Metaphysical theories of perception are rarely framed as necessary truths, we can 
take a brief detour into the history of the debate. Each of the Metaphysical theories of perception 
(intentionalism, naïve realism, sense-datum theories and adverbialism) was introduced to show how 
perceptual experience is possible in the face of the worry that perception, as we ordinarily understand 
it, might be impossible. Also known as the ‘Problem of Perception’, this worry arises when we try to 
reconcile the apparent properties of perception with each other. On one hand, our ordinary 
perceptual experiences seem to give us access to mind-independent features of the world. But on the 
other hand, at least some of our perceptual experiences are illusory or hallucinatory and thus 
inaccurate with respect to the mind-independent features of the world. The Problem of Perception 
is the problem of providing an account of perceptual experience that can make sense of both of 
these features: perception’s ability to reveal the world to us, and its ability to mislead us.11 
“The Problem of Perception is that if illusions and hallucinations are possible, then 
perception, as we ordinarily understand it, is impossible. […] if these kinds of error are 
possible, how can perception be what we ordinarily understand it to be, an openness to and 
awareness of the world?” (Crane and French 2017) 
 
I propose, therefore, that Metaphysical theories of perception should initially be understood as 
theories of how perception might possibly be: they are attempts to offer an intelligible account of 
perception which solves or dissolves the Problem of Perception. There is nothing to prevent one 
from trying to solve the Problem of Perception with claims of metaphysical necessity, but since 
solving the problem requires only claims of possibility, we should not expect to find Metaphysical 
theories of perception standardly proposed as claims of metaphysical necessity. Contemporary 
philosophers of perception, however, generally attempt to do more than demonstrate that a 
particular theory of perception is possible. The debate over Metaphysical theories of perception 
seems to be concerned with figuring out which of these theories of perception is the right one: 
intentionalists, for example, take their theory to be correct and naïve realism to be wrong; while 
naïve realists take their own view to be correct and intentionalism to be wrong.  
 
 
11 For further discussion of the supposed conflict between different features of perceptual experience and 
how it challenges the possibility of perception, see Crane (2005). 
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In this respect, the Metaphysical debate appears to be strikingly similar to the Psychological debate, 
which focuses on which possible account of perception (ecological or constructivist) is preferable. 
Psychological theories of perception are also proposed as contingent rather than necessary: their 
proponents allow that in a different sort of environment, our perceptual systems could have evolved 
differently. There is no obvious justification, therefore, for interpreting the Metaphysical and 
Psychological theories of perception as differing in the modal strength of their claims.  
 
3.2 Do the theories result from different methodologies?  
Scientific and philosophical theories have often been supposed to differ in methodology as well as 
modal strength – particularly prior to Quine’s (1951) rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction. 
Philosophical methodology is sometimes characterized as employing a priori reflection on our 
concepts, for example, while scientific methodology uses a posteriori means to test the empirical 
predictions of our scientific hypotheses. Might we distinguish between the Psychological and 
Metaphysical debates about perception along these methodological lines? 
 
An obvious problem with this approach is that, post-Quine, philosophers generally agree that there 
is nothing essentially a priori about conceptual analysis. Conversely, science does not always proceed 
by empirical inquiry: scientists often compare and evaluate theories which make the same empirical 
predictions. They do so by drawing an inference to the best explanation, taking into account 
theoretical virtues such as simplicity, parsimony, fruitfulness, and compatibility with other theories, 
in addition to virtues such as empirical adequacy and predictive strength. Not all scientific theories 
make empirical predictions: some use hypothetical toy models to capture aspects of the world that 
are “often unobservable, indirectly confirmable, and abstract” (Paul 2012, 9).  
 
Even if one were to reject Quinean naturalism, however, it would be difficult to find a 
methodological distinction between the Metaphysical and Psychological debates about perception. 
Notice that Psychological theories of perception are not generally engaged in making empirical 
predictions: constructivist and ecological theories are examples of the toy models mentioned above, 
which don’t make observable or directly confirmable predictions. And as I have already observed, 
proponents of Metaphysical theories are not generally engaged in analysing the concept of 
perception into necessary and sufficient conditions. They are instead putting forward possible 
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theories of perception and debating their relative merits, in a process which resembles the 
methodology of inference to the best explanation.12 This methodology is explicitly endorsed in the 
literature.  When the naïve realist, for example, argues that perception is a non-representational 
relation to the world, they are claiming that their theory offers a better explanation of certain 
perceptual features than the rival theories: 
“What reason is there for thinking that naïve realism about visual experiences is true? The 
NR [naïve realist] claims that the best explanation of the fact that visual experiences 
introspectively seem to have the NR property […] is that veridical experiences actually do 
have it: having the NR property explains the way visual experiences introspectively seem.” 
(Nudds 2009, 335, my italics) 
Those who reject naïve realism tend to present themselves as offering a “a better explanation” than 
naïve realism of perceptual experience, often appealing to illusions as “powerful abductive support” 
for intentionalism (Philips 2016, 355, author’s italics). Cavedon-Taylor, for example, explicitly 
acknowledges in his own proposal for an intentionalist claim that his “argument for this claim is an 
inference to the best explanation” (Cavedon-Taylor 2018, 391, my italics).  
 
Proponents of Metaphysical theories of perception can generally be understood as employing 
inference to the best explanation. Unsurprisingly, Psychological theories of perception are also the 
result of inference to the best explanation: constructivists propose that the best way to account for 
perception is to assume that our sensory input is supplemented by stored information and inferential 
processing; while ecological theorists propose that perception is best explained by our active role in 
our sensory environments, which removes any role for inference. We cannot easily distinguish 
between the Metaphysical and Psychological debates, therefore, by appealing to their broad 
methodological approaches.13  
 
 
12 There is nothing singular in this respect about perceptual metaphysics: many metaphysical arguments rely on inference 
to the best explanation. For further discussion, see Hawley (2006), Paul (2012), Williamson (2016).  
13 There may, however, be a way to distinguish the transcendental arguments mentioned previously from 
inferences to the best explanation. See Gomes (2017) and Allen (2019) for discussion of the relationship 
between transcendental argument and inference to the best explanation in the philosophy of perception.  
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One might object that there is a more fine-grained methodological difference between the two 
debates. Despite my characterization of constructivist and ecological theories as hypothetical toy 
models, one might think that Psychological theories have a place for empirical evidence which 
Metaphysical theories lack. But any characterization of the Metaphysical debate as non-empirical 
seems to be at odds with the very idea of inference to the best explanation, which is usually 
understood as sensitive to all the available evidence (empirical or otherwise). When inference to the 
best explanation is used to construct and select between philosophical theories, presumably the 
evidence base should include all of our relevant knowledge, just as it does when it applies to 
scientific theorizing. There should be, in particular, “no restriction to knowledge gained in some 
special “conceptual” or “a priori” or “intuitional” or “armchair” way” (Williamson 2016, 268).  
 
It looks like we cannot appeal to any peculiarly philosophical methodology to distinguish 
Metaphysical theories of perception from Psychological theories. Both use the methodology of 
inference to the best explanation, and neither makes easily testable claims about empirical matters of 
fact. A more fruitful way to address the distinction might be to allow that both debates are using 
inference to the best explanation, but with a different kind of explanation. Next I will consider 
whether Metaphysical theories are proposing an inference to the best constitutive explanation and 
Psychological theories are proposing an inference to the best causal explanation. 
 
 
3.3 Is there a difference in whether the explanations are causal or constitutive? 
Some philosophers have been inclined to see the distinction between metaphysics and science as a 
difference between constitutive and causal explanations. Many metaphysical explanations are indeed 
constitutive: they account for something’s existence or occurrence by appealing to the kind of thing 
it is or consists in, that in virtue of which it has certain properties. Constitutive explanations like these are 
synchronic: if a change to an object or event is explained in terms of a change to its constitutive 
basis, these changes occur at the same instant rather than over a period of time.  The explanandum 
and explanans of constitutive explanations are not independent existences. Many scientific 
explanations, on the other hand, are causal: they account for something’s existence or occurrence by 
appealing to the etiological sequence of events which brought it about. Causal explanations are 
diachronic (i.e. they take time), and the cause (explanans) and effect (explanandum) are distinct 
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existences.14 Could we argue, therefore, that both Metaphysical and Psychological approaches to 
perception use the same broad strategy of inference to the best explanation, but applied to 
constitutive and causal explanations respectively?  
 
When we look at the Metaphysical debate about perception, it certainly seems to be primarily 
concerned with the constitution of perception: naïve realism is characterized as the claim that 
perceptual experience consists in being related to mind-independent objects; while intentionalism is 
the view that we perceive in virtue of representing the world in certain ways. These Metaphysical 
theories are proposed as synchronic explanations of what perception consists in, rather than 
diachronic explanations of the temporal antecedents to perceptual experience: “that in virtue of which 
it [perceptual experience] has all the other psychological properties it does” (Logue 2011, 269, my 
italics); “the kind in virtue of which [it] has the nature it does” (Martin 2004, 60, my italics).15 Further 
evidence of this commitment to constitutive explanation can be found throughout the philosophy of 
perception: for a representative sample see Brewer (2011), Stazicker (2015), Crane and French 
(2017), and Brogaard (2018). We should therefore understand naïve realism, intentionalism, and 
other Metaphysical theories of perception as offering constitutive explanations of perceptual 
experience.16 
 
If Psychological theories of perception offer causal (non-constitutive) explanations, then we would 
have a way to contrast the Metaphysical and Psychological debates. Some philosophers of 
perception do indeed characterize the debate in this way, proposing that scientific psychology 
provides information only about the causes of perceptual experience. McDowell, for example, claims 
 
14 See Ylikoski (2013) for a fuller discussion of the differences between constitutive and causal explanations. I 
am not taking any particular stance on the nature of causation or constitution or the dependence relations 
involved. I remain neutral as to the relation between constitution and identity.  
15 I take it that claims about the constitution of perception need not be understood as claims of metaphysical 
necessity. As Leuenberger (2014) and others have argued, metaphysical determination relations can be 
contingent.  
16 There is no tension between saying that an explanation is both constitutive and an inference to the best 
explanation. The methodology of inference to the best explanation is widely understood to apply to both 
causal and non-causal explanation: Williamson (2016) gives the example of Newton’s laws, which provided 
the best explanation of Kepler’s laws, but certainly not because Newton’s laws caused Kepler’s laws. 
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that science addresses the “causal or enabling question” of perception, and cautions us to resist the 
“temptation to suppose that the question is rather a constitutive one” (McDowell 1994, 199). This is 
a controversial way to characterize the debate, however, as I will now argue: the mind-sciences are 
concerned primarily with explaining our cognitive capacities (rather than particular events or 
behaviors) and explanations of capacities are usually understood as constitutive (rather than causal).   
 
The mind-sciences are not primarily engaged in explaining particular events, such as single instances 
of cognition or behaviour. Instead, their aim is “to explain the human cognitive capacities – what 
they are, how they are exercised, in virtue of what we have them, and how they interact” (Von 
Eckardt 1995, 258). When cognitive scientists, for example, offer explanations of how we are able to 
comprehend language, to attribute mental states to others, or to perceive the world around us, they 
seeking to account in each case for a particular cognitive capacity.  There is a general consensus in 
the literature that the explananda of the mind sciences are cognitive capacities: see Wallis (1994), 
Rupert (2009), Samuels, Margolis and Stich (2012), Miracchi (2017) for further evidence.17  
 
Explanations of capacities are constitutive explanations: they are not diachronic explanations of one 
event or phenomenon in terms of the causal processes leading to it, but rather synchronic 
explanations concerning what gives rise to the capacity: what it consists in. In this respect, 
explanations of capacities are similar to explanations of abilities, dispositions and propensities 
(Ylikoski 2013). When we try to account for the fragility of a vase, for example, we are not usually 
trying to give an etiological explanation of how the vase came to acquire the property of fragility. 
Instead, we are trying to say what the vase’s fragility consists in: which are the properties of the vase 
in virtue of which it has the simultaneous property of being fragile? Something similar is going in in 
our explanations of cognitive capacities, when we ask what our ability to attribute mental states to 
others consists in and in virtue of what we can comprehend language.18 
 
17 It is also widely acknowledged in the same literature that on the occasions where do want to give a causal 
explanation of a particular cognitive event, we do so by identifying the capacity of which it is a manifestation. 
18 It is not particularly surprising to learn that scientific explanations can be constitutive explanations, because 
this is not confined to the mind-sciences. Facts about water’s behavior at different temperatures, for example, 
can be scientifically explained in virtue of its molecular properties, which in turn can be scientifically explained 
in virtue of atomic properties and physical forces. Science tells us what atoms, molecules, ecosystems and 
weather fronts are, not merely what causes them. There has been much interest of late in the role played by 
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Even when scientific psychologists do want to give a causal explanation of the source of a particular 
token mental state (e.g. a belief or a perceptual experience), the methodology is usually one of 
explaining how that token mental state can be a manifestation of a mental capacity.19 The primary 
focus of the mind-sciences is not the causal explanation of individual mental states, but rather the 
constitutive explanation of mental capacities: what they are, what they consist in, that in virtue of 
which we have them. This general lesson transfers to Psychological theories of perception, and is 
presumably what motivates Burge to claim that constructivist Psychological theories of perception 
are offering constitutive explanations: he takes it that the aim of perceptual psychology is to explain 
the structure of perception, and not merely to provide enabling conditions of perception (Burge 
2005, 21). (See Fish, this volume, for discussion of the debate between Burge and McDowell on 
constitutive and causal-enabling explanations.)20  
 
It seems plausible, therefore, that Psychological explanations of perception are attempts to give a 
constitutive account of our capacity to perceive. If this is correct, then both the Metaphysical and 
Psychological debates about perception involve inferences to the best constitutive explanation.    
 
3.4 Are there different kinds of constitutive explanation? 
Even if both Psychological and Metaphysical theories offer similarly constitutive explanations of 
perceptual experience, it might be possible to distinguish them by appealing to two different kinds 
of constitutive explanation. We might explore, for example, whether Metaphysical and Psychological 
theories are relying on different concepts of constitution, and whether these concepts pick out 
different kinds of dependence relations.21 But notice that even if there are different notions of 
constitution, this does not entail that only one of them has a place in metaphysical explanations.  
 
 
non-causal (including constitutive) explanations in science: for the current state of play, see Reutlinger and 
Saatsi (eds.) (2018). 
19 See Wallis (1994), Rupert (2009). 
20 One might argue we nevertheless ought to draw the distinction between metaphysical and scientific 
explanations in constitutive/causal terms, but this would be a particularly revisionary claim. 
21 See Harbecke (2016) for a discussion of the relationship between material constitution and mechanistic 
constitution, for example.  
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Some philosophers of perception seem to suggest that the difference between the Metaphysical and 
Psychological debates is in the ‘level’ of explanation concerned. There is a distinction in philosophy 
of mind between personal and subpersonal levels, which corresponds to the following two ways of 
ascribing mental states. When we speak of someone calculating a sum, representing a stick in water 
as bent, or predicting the outcome of an election, we are attributing the calculations, representations 
and predictions to the person. To give an explanation of mental phenomena by attributing 
psychological states to persons in this way is to give a personal-level explanation. In the mind-
sciences, however, it is common to ascribe the same psychological terms to cognitive subsystems of 
the person: we might speak of the visual system calculating the Laplacian of the Gaussian, a neural 
structure representing left-to-right motion, or a Bayesian network predicting the next input. To give 
an explanation of phenomena by attributing psychological states to subsystems of the person like 
this is to give a subpersonal-level explanation.  
 
Metaphysical theories of perception appear to offer personal-level explanations: they account for 
perceptual experience by appealing to how the person relates to or represents the world. Some 
philosophers take this feature to be definitive of metaphysical theories of perception: “What my 
experience fundamentally consists in (i.e. its metaphysical structure) is that which provides the 
ultimate personal-level psychological explanation of the phenomenal, epistemological and 
behavioural facts.” (Logue 2012, 212). Logue contrasts personal-level theories such as naïve realism 
with scientific theories which appeal to “subpersonal psychological facts (e.g. the perceptual 
processing in the brain that takes place between stimulation of the sensory organs and experience)” 
(Logue 2012, 212). This description seems to accurately capture some Psychological theories of 
perception: many computational constructivist theories, for example, ascribe representations of low-
level visual features to the person’s early visual system rather than to the person. But not all 
constructivist theories offer subpersonal-level explanations: in Helmholtz’s (1878) original 
constructivist theory, it is the person who draws the inferences (albeit unconsciously) rather than 
some visual subsystem. Furthermore, ecological theories are particularly difficult to characterize as 
subpersonal-level explanations of perception, because they do not attribute representations to any 
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part of the cognitive system.22 So we cannot easily map the personal/subpersonal distinction onto 
the distinction between Metaphysical and Psychological theories of perception.   
 
For the sake of argument, however, I wish to grant that there may be some way to make sense of 
Metaphysical theories as personal and Psychological theories as subpersonal. Acknowledging this, 
however, would not yet explain why proponents of Metaphysical theories of perception take 
themselves to be engaged in a project which is separate from and orthogonal to the Psychological 
debate. When two explanations of one phenomenon focus on different properties or levels of 
generality, we cannot generally conclude that the resulting explanations are independent from each 
other in any interesting sense. Consider the case of a chemist and a physicist giving constitutive 
explanations of properties of water by appealing respectively to its molecular and atomic structure. 
We do not assume that the atomic explanation is unconnected to the molecular explanation; in fact, 
we might even think that the molecular explanation holds in virtue of the atomic explanation. There 
are many philosophers who think that personal and subpersonal psychological explanations stand in 
a comparable relationship to molecular and atomic explanations, and who propose that personal-
level explanations are reducible to subpersonal explanations.23  
 
Those philosophers who think that the Psychological debate is orthogonal to the Metaphysical 
debate seem to be making a certain assumption about the relationship between personal and 
subpersonal explanation. They believe that personal-level explanations of perceptual experience play 
a privileged role in providing a metaphysical explanation of the nature of perception, and that these 
personal-level explanations are independent from subpersonal-level explanations. This is a familiar 
 
22 Notice that not all ways of explaining the brain are subpersonal-level explanations. Subpersonal 
explanation is a kind of psychological explanation which ascribes psychological states (e.g. calculations, 
representations, prediction) to subsystems of the person. A neural explanation in terms of firing rate or 
neurotransmitter uptake is not a subpersonal psychological explanation, but rather a neurological (non-
psychological) explanation. The particular usefulness of subpersonal explanations comes from their being 
psychological explanations: they allow us to ascribe contentful mental states where the person would not 
necessarily endorse the content or even have the concepts to express it. The use of subpersonal explanation is 
consistent with different ontological interpretations: subpersonal explanations might refer to genuinely 
contentful mental states, some deflationary kind of computational processing, or nothing at all.  
23 This is probably the default view among philosophers of cognitive science. It has been articulated as 
‘homuncular functionalism’ by Lycan (1987); see also Fodor (1975).  
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position in philosophy of mind, most commonly associated with the Sellarsian idea that explanations 
of mentality belong to a normative ‘space of reasons’, and not with our descriptive explanations of 
the scientific world.24 On this view, personal-level psychological explanations are constrained by 
norms of rationality, which makes them autonomous from and irreducible to the causal explanations 
offered by the mind-sciences.25  
 
The Sellarsian position, however, is just one way to interpret the relation between personal and 
subpersonal explanations. As I have already observed, there are philosophers who think that 
personal-level explanations can be neatly reduced to subpersonal-level explanations, and there are 
alternatives beyond these two approaches. Those taking a Sellarsian approach to perception, 
however, seem to think that only personal-level explanations provide metaphysical explanations; 
subpersonal explanations are dismissed as belonging to some distinct and non-metaphysical project. 
I have no interest here in settling whether personal-level explanations are autonomous from or 
reducible to subpersonal explanations: I’m simply suggesting that the question itself is a matter for 
metaphysical discussion, and recommending that metaphysicians of perception should at least 
consider the possibility that reductive theories can still be metaphysical theories.  
 
4 Conclusion 
 
I have argued that Psychological theories of perception, such as ecological and constructivist 
theories, are not clearly distinguishable in terms of their modal strength or methodology from 
Metaphysical theories of perception, such as naïve realism and intentionalism. I have not tried to 
provide an exhaustive refutation of all possible ways to distinguish the two projects. I happily 
acknowledge that there are differences between the two projects: differences in how the explanandum 
is framed, for example, and differences in the motivations and background assumptions of the 
 
24 The space of reasons is introduced in Sellars (1956). For further discussion of the Sellarsian interpretation 
of the personal/subpersonal distinction, see Drayson (2014).  
25 The Sellarsian position sits uneasily with work in scientific psychology which gives subpersonal content an 
explanatory role. By characterizing subpersonal explanation as merely causal, these philosophers must 
interpret their content ascriptions as purely instrumental and therefore non-causal. For more on different 
approaches to the personal/subpersonal distinction, see Drayson (2012, 2014, 2017).  
Final draft: please cite published version in Heather Logue and Louise Richardson (eds.),  
Purpose and Procedure in the Philosophy of Perception (OUP) 
 
 19 
theorists.26 But I think that we should be wary of assuming that these differences make the two 
projects orthogonal to or independent from each other.27  
 
I propose that both Metaphysical and Psychological theories of perception can be understood as 
trying to answer the same metaphysical question about the nature of perception: what is it that 
constitutes perception? Notably, my argument for this does not rely on any taking any particularly 
naturalistic stance. I have not denied a role for a priori theorizing, for example, or claimed that our 
scientific judgments are evidentially stronger than our intuitions. I have pointed out that that there is 
an ongoing debate about the role which scientific theories play in metaphysics, but I have not taken 
a side in this debate. In this paper, I am merely suggesting that we should acknowledge the 
possibility of more naturalistic metaphysical positions within the philosophy of perception, instead 
of ruling that those positions are engaged in a completely different project. 
 
Why do some philosophers of perception deny Psychological theories a place in the debate over the 
metaphysical nature of perception? I do not that think simple anti-naturalism is to blame: I suspect 
that many people who deny a role for scientific theories in the metaphysics of perception would 
happily concede that being H2O is a metaphysical fact about water, and that having atomic number 
79 is a metaphysical fact about gold. Philosophers might allow that water and gold can have 
scientifically-discovered metaphysical properties, but deny that the same is true of mental 
phenomena. I think that this is the role played by the Sellarsian interpretation of the 
personal/subpersonal distinction in the metaphysics of perception, with the resulting claim that 
perceptual experience, as a mental phenomenon, is governed by different explanatory norms than 
water or gold. I won’t attempt to argue against such approaches here. My aim is simply to highlight 
that other metaphysical positions are available, and that the philosophy of perception seems to be an 
outlier in its reluctance to accommodate them. In the metaphysics of mind more generally, there is 
 
26 See Fish (this volume) for discussion of the differences between the projects of Burge and McDowell, for 
example, with respect to whether explanations of perception must account for conscious experience. (I am assuming 
that both Metaphysical and Psychological theories are concerned with explaining conscious perceptual experience, 
and that both should allow for the metaphysical possibility of unconscious perception.)  
27 A theory which explains the boiling point of water has a different explanandum from a theory which 
explains the pH value of water, for example, but we would not conclude from that the theories are 
orthogonal. 
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an active debate about whether personal-level explanations are autonomous from, reducible to, or 
eliminated by subpersonal-level explanations.28 In the metaphysics of perception, however, those 
who take the subpersonal level to play a role in determining the nature of perception are sometimes 
considered, as a result, not to be engaging with the metaphysical debate. I think that we do a 
disservice to both philosophy and science if we assume without argument that the metaphysics of 
mind must be conducted solely at one particular level of explanation.  
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